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HANCOCK COUNTY, '.KENTUCKY, and WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, IWi <2 I W3
Petitioners, v ;THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RespoO&Mfcs . KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANYgQIJRT O F &&P&&I
tJIMtSatIntervening-Respondent
^^^h

«

No. 83-3108 nl
nl NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. Sixth Circuit
Rule 24 limits citation to specific situations. Please see
Rule 24 before citing in a proceeding in a court in the
Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be served on other
parties and the Court. This notice is to be prominently
displayed if this decision is reproduced.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
22 ERC (BNA) 1714
August 14, 1984
IIOR HISTORY: ON APPEAL FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
D

INION: BEFORE: CONTIE and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and COHN, District Judge.

* Honorable Avern Cohn, U.S. District Judge, U.S. District Court for the
astern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge. Petitioners, Hancock County, Kentucky, nl and
illamette Industries, Inc. (Willamette), seek review of the grant by the Unite*
tates Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), respondent, of a Prevention of
ignificant Deterioration (PSD) permit for the construction of two 650-megawat
oal-fired electric power plants in Hancock County by Kentucky Utilities Compan
KU), intervenor-respondent.
nl Petitioner Hancock County, Kentucky, joined in and relies solely upon the
rguments made in petitioner Willamette's briefs on this appeal.
On July 26, 1978, KU submitted to the Kentucky Department for Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection (DNREP) n2 its application for a PSD
^ermit to construct the power plants in Hancock County. The PSD administrative
-eview, as prescribed by the Clear Air Act and its 1977 Amendments (Act), 42
KS.C.
@ 7470, et. seq., requires EPA to determine that plants such as those
>roposed by KU will meet certain air quality criteria. National Ambient Air
quality Standards (NAAQS) must be met, the best available pollution control
*echnology (BACT) employed, and an analysis of any air quality impacts project*
n an area as a result of growth associated with such a facility must be made.
-2 U.S.C. @ 7470(3), (4), and (6). The Act also imposes an absolute ceiling oi
evels of permissible increased pollution in all areas of the United States.
Tie permissible increased levels of pollution in each "clean air" area are
*eferred to as increments. An applicant must demonstrate that its facility wi
ot cause air pollution in excess of the maximum allowable increment. See 42
J.S.C. @ 7473. The available increments for a particular area are reserved to
applicants on a "first-come, first-served" basis; the first applicant to submi
i completed application for a construction permit, thereby initiating this PSD
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view process, is awarded the increments that will be consumed by the source's
issions. See 43 Fed. Reg. 26401 (1978).
n2 EPA has delegated its administrative authority to operate the PSD program
DNREP, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. @ 52.21(U) (1970).
The review process also requires that a public hearing be held "with
)portunity for interested persons including representatives of the
[ministrator to appear and submit written or oral presentations on the air
lality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control technology
iquirements, and other appropriate considerations." 42 U.S.C. @ 7475(a). By
>gulation, 40 C.F.R. @ 124, (former regulation 40 C.F.R. @ 52.21 (1978)), once
permit application is completed, EPA tentatively determines whether to grant
: deny a PSD permit; the public must be given notice thereof and provided with
le draft permit for a 30-day public comment period thereupon. 40 C.F.R. @@
24.6(b), 124.10(a), (b). The public also has access to all documents and data
lbmitted or used by EPA in its review and decision making process. 5 U.S.C. @
32. Notice of any public hearing must be given thirty days prior to the
taring. 40 C.F.R. @ 124.10(b). EPA must consider all oral and written
:atements made during the comment period and public hearing and respond to all
significant" comments. 40 C.F.R. @@ 124.11, 124.17.
After the close of the comment period, the Regional Administrator must issue
id give public notice of "final permit decision." 40 C.F.R. @ 124.15(a). An
iterested party may petition for review by the Administrator within thirty day^
lereafter. 40 C.F.R. @ 124.19. The Administrator's review postpones the
Effective date of the permit decision and determines final agency action. 40
.F.R. @ 124.15(b). A completed PSD permit application "shall be granted or
2nied no later than one year after the date of filing of such completed
pplication." 42 U.S.C. @ 7475(c). After final decision by the Administrator, c
arty may appeal the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
ffected region. 42 U.S.C. @ 7607(b).
Upon review of KU's PSD permit application on July 26, 1978, DNREP found it
omplete and tentatively reserved for KU first priority to use the PSD incremenl
n Hancock County. On July 26, 1979, DNREP suspended this increment reservatioi
n the basis that KU might be required under Ky. Rev. Stat. 278.020(3) to obtaii
certificate of convenience and necessity showing sufficient demand for power
o justify construction of its proposed plants. Thereafter, DNREP determined
hat such a certificate was not a prerequisite to the issuance of a PSD permit,
nd consequently, withdrew its suspension of the increment reservation on Augusi
8, 1979.
On September 20, 1979, Western Kraft, a subsidiary of Willamette, filed an
dministrative petition for review of this DNREP decision on the increment
eservation. Approximately two weeks later, Western Kraft obtained a
estraining order from a Kentucky Circuit Court, barring DNREP from processing
U's application until resolution of the administrative petition. On June 2,
980, EPA withdrew DNREP's authority to process the KU PSD permit application,
nd took sole responsibility for completing the processing of the application,
uch authority by EPA was assumed "because of the state court injunction
rohibiting [DNREP] from taking further action on that permit." In June, 1980,
he administrative proceeding resulted in a decision upholding DNREP's ruling i:
egard to the certificate of convenience and necessity. Western Kraft then
iled another action in state court challenging the merits of the DNREP
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.ing, which was ultimately upheld by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. See
;tern Kraft Paper Group v. Kentucky Department for National Resources and
rironmental Protection, No. 81-CA-335-MR (Ky.Ct.App. Sept. 18, 1981).
We note that Western Kraft, on November 1, 1979, submitted its own
)lication to DNREP for a PSD permit authorizing expansion of its existing pulp
1 paper plant in Hancock County on land adjacent to KU's proposed site for the
istruction of the two power plants. On April 29, 1980, Western Kraft
emitted another application to DNREP for PSD permit authorizing further
)ansion of its plant.
On April 30, 1980, DNREP sent the first Western Kraft applicaton to EPA for
5 final decision on permit issuance or denial. EPA conditionally granted this
:mit on June 2, 1980:
Within 90 days of permit issuance, more stringent permit conditions may be
le a part of this permit or the permit may be revoked. One of these actions
lid take place only if from information obtained as the result of the public
iring on the Kentucky Utilities (KU) PSD permit, EPA concludes that both
irees cannot be permitted at limits contained in each application. Further,
Llamette agrees not to challenge the validity of the above condition,
fever, Willamette reserves the right to challenge the validity of any more
ringent permit conditions or any revocation subsequently imposed.
EPA received no such information and thus the Western Kraft permit was not
/ised.
On December 2, 1980, DNREP issued Western Kraft its second PSD permit. (EPA
1 delegated authority to DNREP to do so). This permit showed that both KU and
Llamette could operate their proposed projects in Hancock County without
elating PSD increments or the NAAQS in that county.
The standard of review for all of the issues raised in this case is governed
@ 10(e) of the Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. @ 706. This court may
: aside EPA's action only if that action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "in excess of
itutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations." 5 U.S.C. @ 706(2)(A) and
). As the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
L U.S. 402, 416 (1971), noted:
To make this finding [in regard to agency action] the Court must consider
sther the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
2ther there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry
:o the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review
a narrow one. The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
the agency.
As this court noted in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. E.P.A., 572 F.2d
50, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978): "[W]e are required to affirm [the actions of the
i] if there is a rational basis for the agency action. . . . " Further, as
served in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16(1965):
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great
zerence to the interpretation given by the statute by the officers or agency
irged with its administration. . . . When the construction of an
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linistrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even
e clearly in order.
Willamette, relying on 42 U.S.C. @ 7475(c), n3 argues on this appeal that
i did not have the authority to issue a PSD permit to KU because more than one
ir had elapsed between the time KU's application was deemed completed (July
1979), and the time EPA issued KU its PSD permit (April 15, 1979). EPA
itends that Willamette lacks standing to challenge under this one year
litations provision EPA's authority to issue KU's permit.
n3 42 U.S.C. @ 7475(c) provides:
Any completed permit application . . . for a major emitting facility in any
>a to which this part applies shall be granted or denied not later than one
tr after the date of filing of such completed application.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
i State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-475 (1982), provides a recent discussion by
> Supreme Court on the principles of standing:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill [of the Constitution] requires the
:ty who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered
le actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct
the defendant," Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
)79), and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and
> likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Lfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) [footnote omitted].
* * *

Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also
lered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing,
is, this Court has held that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own
jal rights and interests and cannot rest hs claim to relief on the legal
jhts or interests of third parties." Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 499
:>otnote omitted]. In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged
Iressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. Ill, the Court
s refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public significancer
Lch amount to "generalized grievances," pervasively shared and most
Dropriately addressed in the representative branches. Id. at 499-500
)otnote omitted]. Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff's
nplaint fall within "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
itute or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Processing
rvice Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) [footnote omitted].
The only injury n4 that Willamette alleges that it "personally" suffered by
^'s failure to meet this one year limitation in Section 7475(c) is:
EPA's issuance of KU's permit may yet injure Williamette by forcing it to
Juce its permitted emissions. EPA issues PSD permits based on models of the
: quality impacts of planned projects. If KU's post-construction monitoring
juired by the proposed permit indicates that its modeling was erroneous and
it the normal ambient air quality standards are exceeded, existing industry ining Williamette - may have to roll back its emissions.
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n4 Willamette's assertion that KU's operations under the PSD permit will
jse injury, through coal dust emissions, to Willamette's paper plants has no
mection to the standing issue in regard to the limitations period since this
Leged injury cannot be found to flow from EPA's failure to comply with the
nitations period.
Respondent's Brief at 2-3.
It is difficult to ascertain any injury suffered by Willamette because of
k's failure to grant KU a permit within one year of its completed application,
i Willamette makes little attempt to pinpoint such an injury,
st-construction monitoring that might possibly result in the rollback of
iginally permitted emissions can only occur after the grant of a PSD permit
d thus it is questionable whether any injury flowing thereform has a relation
whether such a permit was granted within a year of the completed PSD
plication. Moreover, this alleged injury is speculative at best, and it is
ubtful whether it can be "fairly traced to the challenged action." See Valley
rge, supra.
Both parties agreed that the purpose of the one year limitation in Section
75(c) is to assure that the "time needed to . . . implement [PSD] regulations
aid not cause current construction to be halted or clamp even a temporary
ratorium on planned industrial and economic development." H.R. Rep. No.
-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-172 (1977). The parties differ, however, as
whom the statute was designed to protect. EPA contends that this time
mitation was intended by Congress to protect only the permit applicant whereas
llamette contends that the statute was designed to protect third parties, such
Willamette. Willamette reasons that because Congress imposed a one year
adline on the granting or denying of PSD permit, a permit applicant is not
otected by a statutory directive since "it is the denial that releases the
crement for others to us." (Respondent's Brief at 5.) But even assuming at
is juncture that Willamette's interpretation of this statute is correct, it is
ear that the delay in granting KUY's application did not cause Willamette's
urrent construction to be halted" or "a temporary moratorium" on Willamette's
anned development. On the contrary, after KU obtained priority to certain
crements by virtue of its completed application, Willamette applied for and
ceived two PSD permits authorizing the expansion of its Hancock County plant,
ould other industrial applicants for a PSD permit in Hancock County surface
ose rights may be proven limited by reason of the pendency of the KU permit,
different case would then be presented.
As for the contention of EPA and KU that Willamette's interest is not in the
one of interests" protected by one year limitation because that limitation
otects only the PSD applicant, this type of standing analysis is of a
rudential" nature and comes into play only if it is determined that a party
s standing under Article III:
Merely to articulate these [prudential] principles is to demonstrate their
ose relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. Ill requirement of
tual or threatened injury amenable to judicial remedy. But neither the
unsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the "case or controversy"
quirement should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. Ill requirements
emselves. Satisfaction of the former cannot substitute for a demonstration of
distinct and palpable injury" . . . that is likely to be redressed if the
quested relief is granted [citation omitted]."
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Valley Forge, 102 at 760.
Willamette lacks standing to challenge EPA's authority to issue KU's permit
3er the one year limitations period, applying the prudential zone of inerests
st. A zone of interests was sought to be protected by the limitations
ovisions in @ 7475(c). We find, in accordance with EPA's interpretation, that
a limitations period protects permit applicants only; in this case, KU. The
gislative history of @ 7475(c) does not indicate an intent to protect third
rties. In addition, 40 C.F.R. @ 124.4 indicates that the limitations
ovision was aimed at protecting applicants only since it expressly provides,
connection with the consolidation of the processing of PSD permits with other
vironmental permit applications, that EPA can delay final action on a PSD
rmit application for more than one year with the consent of the applicant,
reover, the Preamble to @ 124.4 specifically refers to the "applicant's right
a speedy decision [so that] consolidation leading to a breach of the deadline
11 not occur without the applicant's consent" in regard to a PSD permit. Fed.
g., May 19, 1980, Vol. 45, No. 98, p. 33408.
These factors lead us to conclude that EPA's interpretation of @ 7475(c) has
"rational basis," indicating that the purpose of the time limitation, to
event a moratorium on planned economic development, is to prevent the EPA,
cause of delay in granting or denying an application, from causing the
iplicant to experience a moratorium on its planned development during the
ilay. As noted earlier, great deference is given to an agency's interpretation
a statute when that agency is charged with its administration, and we defer
> the agency's interpretation of the time limitation. Accordingly, we hold
Lat Willamette does not have standing to assert that EPA lacked the authority
> issue KU's permit because it failed to meet the one year limitations period,
iderlying this holding is our recognition that the one year time limitation is
>t mandatory in nature so as to deprive EPA of jurisdictional authority to
;sue KU's permit after more than one year had passed between the filing of KU's
)mpleted PSD permit application and the issuance of the permit. This court in
jual Employment Op. Com'n. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th
.r. 1975), indicated that time limitaions, absent "clear congressional intent"
lould not be construed to curtail an agency's exercise of jurisdiction. Other
)urts have held that a statutory limitations period is not mandatory unless it
cpressly requires an agency to act within a specified period and specifies a
msequence for the failure to comply with the provision. See, e.g., Fort Worth
itional Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47, 58 (5th Cir.
)72). The statute in the instant case does not specify a consequence for
iilure to comply with this limitations provision. Although 42 U.S.C. @ 7475(a)
rovides that a major emitting facility cannot be constructed unless certain
squirements are met, the limitations period is not contained under these
^quirements but as a separate subpart of @ 7475. This indicates an absence of
^lear congressional intent" for the limitations period to be jurisdictional.
Dnsequently, we hold that the limitations period in @ 7475(c) is directive in
ature. n5
n5 Although we have held that Willamette lacks standing to raise the
imitations issue, we note that even if we had held to the contrary, we would
Lnd that Willamette was estopped to raise this issue because it was
^sponsible, through state court actions and a series of challenges to the
iequacy of KU's permit application, for much of the delay in question.
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The second contention raised by Willamette is that EPA failed to give
equate consideration to all of the "relevant" factors required by the Clean
: Act: local community opposition, the "nonconstruction" alternative,
:ernative construction sites, and impacts on the local industry and economy.
42 U.S.C. @ 7475(a)(2) provides:
(a) Major emitting facilities on which construction is commenced
No major emitting facility on which construction is commenced after August 7,
77, may be constructed in any area to which this part applies unless —
* * *

(2) the proposed permit has been subject to a review in accordance with this
ction, the required analysis has been conducted in accordance with regulations
omulgated by the Administrator, and a public hearing has been held with
portunity for interested persons including representatives of the
ministrator to appear and submit written or oral presentations on the air
ality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control technology
iquirements, and other appropriate considerations;
42 U.S.C. @ 7479(3) provides:
(3) The term "best available control technology" means an emission limitation
ised on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation
ider this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting
icility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into
:count energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines
s achievable for such facility through application of production processes and
/ailable methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment
c innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. Ir
D event shall aplication of "best available control technology" result in
missions of any pollutants which will exceed the emissions allowed by any
pplicable standard established pursuant to section 7411 or 7412 of this title.
EPA inteprets these statutes as limiting its authority in regard to the PSD
rocess to a review of air quality related impacts of a proposed source. We
ind that there is a rational basis for this interpretation because the factors
ited by Willamette are considered in other proceedings; for example, in
nvironmental Impact Statement (EIS) proceedings. Congress has exempted all
PA actions under the EIS requirement. n6 See 15 U.S.C. @ 793(c)(1). The
tates, however, are free to adopt more stringent standards than those required
nder the Clean Air Act in regard to the PSD proceedings. See S.Rep. No.
5-127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977). Kentucky has not seen fit to adopt
egulations in regard to the PSD process requiring consideration of those facor:
:ited by Willamette. See Ky. Rev. Stat. @ 224.033 (26) (1982). (Regulations t
(reserve clean air resources "shall be no more stringent than federal
•equirements.") The factors cited by Willamette, moreover, are considered in tw
•elated state proceedings. See Ky. Rev. Stat. @ 278.025 (1981) (certificate of
environmental compatibility). Under these circumstances, we hold that EPA's
tuthority under the PSD process is limited to a review of air quality related
.mpacts, which was properly conducted in the instant case.
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n6 40 C.F.R. @ 52.21(s) provides for the coordination of PSD review and the
I process to the "maximum extent feasible and reasonable.11 In the instant
',e, 33 U.S.C. @ 1316(b) triggered the EIS requirement under the Clean Air Act
connection with KU's application for a wastewater discharge permit. The
:ord indicates that EPA complied with 40 C.F.R. @ 52.21 by coordinating to a
:ge extent the EIS and PSD review in this case, and in so doing, consideratio
; given to those factors cited by Willamette relevant to that coordination.
Accordingly, the decision of the EPA is AFFIRMED in all respects.

